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ABSTRACT
Traditionally, policy and planning have been institutionally weak in the Naval Staﬀ
(Oﬃce of the Chief of Naval Operations – OPNAV). In their place, the N8
(Programming) has dominated resource decision-making, and, by default, deci-
sions relating to policy and planning. Recent uncertainty over defense authoriza-
tion and appropriations has resulted in calls for a greater role to be played by the
N3/5, Policy and Plans Directorate. The article argues that reform of the
Department of the Navy’s planning process is urgently needed. OPNAV’s weak
planning and overly dominant programming practices are compared with those
of the Departments of the Army and Air Force and are shown to be out of
conformance with them. The article concludes with speciﬁc and detailed recom-
mendations for reform of both the current planning and programming processes.
KEYWORDS US Department of the Navy; Defense Planning; Planning; Programming; Budgeting; and
Execution (PPBE)
For a variety of reasons, within the Navy Staﬀ (Oﬃce of the Chief of Naval
Operations – OPNAV), formal “planning” as a key instrument of achieving
policy objectives has long been institutionally weak. As a result, formal Navy
plans have exerted weak and inconsistent inﬂuence over the Navy’s
Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) system. In the
recent past, in light of the possible full implementation of the Budget
Control Act, some oﬃcials in the Navy have begun to call for a fundamental
rethinking of how the Navy manages its current PPBE.2 A strong supporter
of the Navy, Congressman Randy Forbes has equally expressed his concern
about how OPNAV operates: “in recent years we seem to have turned
ourselves upside down by increasingly emphasizing programs and force
structure rather than starting with a strategy based on what we need
CONTACT Thomas Durell Young tdyoung@nps.edu
1The views expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reﬂect the policy or views
of the Naval Postgraduate School, Department of the Navy, or Department of Defense.
2Arthur Barber, “Rethinking the Future Fleet,” USNI Proceedings 140/5 (2014), 49.
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naval forces to do and in what scenarios.”3 If one includes an anticipated US
$4 billion shortfall in the Navy’s current 30 Year Shipbuilding Program,4 the
ﬁnancial outlook for funding the Navy could become problematic,5 thereby
lending support to calls for reforming the methods by which oﬃcials
determine priorities.
The reason for the lack of consistent policy and planning inﬂuence in
OPNAV’s programming eﬀorts is multi-faceted. As pointed out by Captain
Peter Haynes, historically those who have ascended to senior leadership
posts in the Navy have done so via one or multiple tours in OPNAV’s
Resources and Capability Integration Division (N8).6 As the integrator of
OPNAV requirements, and the de facto arbitrator of its priorities, the N8
has been in the lead of developing, in eﬀect, its own strategic plans, as
opposed to implementing strategic plans being undertaken by the
Operations, Plans and Strategy Division (N3/N5). Due to these wide-ranging
responsibilities of determining Navy priorities, programming, and budget-
ing, the N8 (and the new N9) possess some ~80 per cent of the entire
OPNAV staﬀ.7 Owing to the lack of centrality of policy and strategy in
guiding the N8’s programming activities, eﬀorts to achieve such inﬂuence
has been almost exclusively via ad hoc structures and planning arrange-
ments, e.g., Deep Blue, N00Z (Strategic Actions Group), N00K (Chief of Naval
Operations’ [CNO’s] Executive Panel), CS21 Refresh, the “Classiﬁed Annex,”
Navy Strategic Enterprise, etc. Moreover, many other organizations can
make claim that they have or share a role in formulating Navy policy,
strategy, and/or planning responsibilities, e.g., the N81, Naval War College,
and Center for Naval Analysis.
As a result of these bureaucratic realities, the N51, the ostensible lead in
the Department of the Navy for national-level policy and planning, has not
been able to frame key strategic challenges to senior Navy leadership
systematically. Moreover, the oﬃce has not been able to position itself “in
front” of the N8’s robust programming process, which is dominated by the
N81 (Capability Assessments) and N82 (Fiscal Management). Additional
evidence that OPNAV has an underdeveloped strategic planning system is
found in the fact that there is no Department of the Navy policy outlining
3Sam LaGrone, “Randy Forbes to CNO Greenert: ‘The Navy desperately needs a strategy,’” USNI News, 1
October 2014, <http://news.usni.org/2014/10/01/randy-forbes-cno-greenert-navy-desperately-needs-
strategy>.
4Harry Kazianis, “The A2/AD challenge: interview with Rep. J. Randy Forbes,” Real Clear Defense, 23
February 2015, <http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2015/02/23/the_a2ad_challenge_inter
view_with_rep_j_randy_forbes.html>.
5For a recent and sober assessment of the ﬁnancial outlook for the Navy see Ronald O’Rourke, “Naval
Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress,” RL32665, Congressional
Research Service, Washington, 4 November 2015.
6Peter D. Haynes, “American Naval Thinking in the Post-Cold War Era: The U.S. Navy and the Emergence
of a Maritime Strategy, 1989–2007,” doctoral dissertation, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013, passim.




























this essential activity; a lacuna that does not exist in either of the other two
military departments,8 let alone the Joint Staﬀ.9 Incomprehensible as it may
seem, the Department of the Navy has a formal instruction for conducting
force structure assessments, but not for how to manage the use of such
reviews in a comprehensive planning process.10 Finally, a review of post-war
history makes clear that this state of aﬀairs has not been accepted by all
secretaries of the Navy, or chiefs of naval operations, which has resulted in
intermittent attempts to exert control over planning and priorities, e.g., the
Maritime Strategy. But even these eﬀorts have only experienced limited
success, let alone longevity. After all, no less an authority that CNO
Admiral Vern Clark claimed that the Navy’s strategy was its Program
Objective Memorandum (POM), its annual budget proposal.11
This essay addresses three issues relating to OPNAV’s PPBE practices. First
is to determine precisely how OPNAV’s PPBE system diﬀers from that of the
other two military departments, and in light of these identiﬁed diﬀerences
whether any of their practices can be applied to OPNAV. The ensuing
analysis will demonstrate that OPNAV’s PPBE procedures are unbalanced
and uniquely indiﬀerent to providing a clear and eﬀective means of trans-
lating policy into capabilities. It will be argued that, as the Department of
Defense’s own PPBE process makes it challenging at best to change the
Future Year Defense Program (FYDP) within its ﬁve-year planning horizon,
the Navy’s unique practice of isolating programming from policy priorities
makes the service potentially more vulnerable to being incapable of making
needed policy changes to its budgeting priorities than are the other two
military departments. Second, given the historically weak role played by the
N5 in policy and planning, how can reforms be designed to provide it with
greater inﬂuence in translating policy into eﬀective plans? The problems of
the N5’s policy and planning eﬀorts, to date, have ranged from such eﬀorts’
infrequency, to their being delivered too late to inﬂuence programming, as
well as their lacking clear expression of priorities. Thirdly, and directly
related to improving policy inﬂuence on budgetary execution, how should
the Navy Secretariat and the N5 change key planning practices of OPNAV’s
PPBE process to tighten the link between policy and execution? In sum, this
essay will argue that there are important lacunae in the current institutional
basis of OPNAV’s unbalanced PPBE process which must be addressed if
budgetary execution is to be made more responsive to policy priorities.
8US Department of the Army, “Planning Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System,” Army
Regulation (AR) 1-1, 9 July 1986; US Department of the Air Force, “Strategic Planning System,” Air
Force Policy Directive 90-11, 26 March 2009.
9US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staﬀ, “Joint Strategic Planning System,” CJCSI 3100.01B, 12
December 2008.
10US Department of the Navy, “Force Structure Assessments,” OPNAVINST 3050.27, N81, 12 February
2015.
11Haynes, “American Naval Thinking in the Post-Cold War Era,” 227–28.



























In addressing these three questions, the essay will argue three theses
regarding the Navy’s strategic planning system. First, the concept of devel-
oping policy and strategy using “resource-unconstrained” thinking and
drafting multi-year long-term development plans not tied to money is a
recipe for bureaucratic irrelevance. Second, there is an urgent need for
OPNAV; collectively, to accept that plans without costed priorities cannot
be implemented by the N8. Policy documents with undeﬁned priorities, or
the use of imprecise “stop light” charts are simply insuﬃcient to enable
programmers to ascertain the “how” in achieving the “what” envisaged in
plans. Third, the N5 needs to replicate the practice of the other two military
departments and recognize the need to remain actively engaged in leading
the development of the POM. In consequence, a short and general planning
document, like the Navy Strategic Plan (NSP), is insuﬃcient alone to enable
the N5 to conduct its strategic planning responsibilities successfully.
Background
The system that has come to be known as PPBE was created at the direction
of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara with a view to aggregating the
three military departments’ independent budgetary processes.12 Arguably, a
critical opportunity was missed in the early development of PPBE in that its
creators made two fateful decisions. First, it was determined that the Oﬃce
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) would not change the existing budgetary
system, thereby enabling the military departments largely to retain their
budgetary independence. Second, it was determined that OSD’s PPBE would
be initiated from input provided by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staﬀ
(in the form of the then Joint Strategic Objectives Plan);13 the Defense
Planning Guidance document would follow later. In eﬀect, although the
military departments had to adopt similar processes and structures to feed
into new OSD processes, “The process became the essential means by which
the US military services protected their respective identities, preferred weap-
ons systems, and relevance.”14
If the PPBE system allowed the military departments to continue to
maintain a high degree of independence from OSD and Joint Staﬀ guidance,
an analysis of OPNAV’s practices demonstrates that it enjoys exceptionalism
unmatched by its military department counterparts. A comparative analysis
of the three PPBE systems demonstrate that OPNAV’s decision-making is
centered in only a few oﬃcials and there is a singular lack of coordination
12See Charles Johnston Hitch, Decision-Making for Defense (Berkeley: University of California Press
1965); Charles Johnston Hitch et al., The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age (New York:
Athenum 1975).
13Hitch, Decision-Making for Defense, 25–26.




























across the entire OPNAV staﬀ, let alone eﬀorts at eﬀecting formal institu-
tional consensus-building.15 Institutionally, since the introduction of PPBE,
the Navy has deﬁned that anything that comes out of OPNAV must relate to
the competition for ﬁnances and therefore must be approved by the N8.
Thus, ﬁnancial decision-making is the responsibility of the N8
(Programming) and, remarkably, not the N5 (Policy and Plans). Even the
Navy’s budget oﬃce is in OPNAV (i.e., N82), which suggests a subordinate
relationship to the CNO, whereas in the other services the budget oﬃce falls
exclusively under the respective civilian-led secretariat. In eﬀect, the Navy’s
budget oﬃce works for the secretariat, but is also oﬃcially responsible to
the CNO. Haynes argues that these practices have had the eﬀect of reinfor-
cing the Navy’s parochialism when addressing strategy development and
have impeded creative and independent thinking.16 Moreover, the N8
engages in a high degree of “force management” responsibilities that are
resident in lower commands in the other military departments. It is little
wonder, therefore, that the OPNAV’s PPBE produces what can be best
described as “strategic budgeting.” This is all the while it limits the inﬂuence
of policy guidance and resource priorities, even those set by the Secretary of
the Navy and the CNO. Arguably, perhaps the current programming system
responds eﬀectively to the ﬂeet’s requirements today, but it must be
acknowledged that this is at the expense of isolating ﬁnancing from policy
priorities that look to the future.
Challenges in Managing the Navy’s Policy and Planning
Not for the want of making valiant attempts to the contrary, the N5’s
strategic planning practices have yet to ﬁnd an eﬀective, and repeatable,
means of developing and conveying policy guidance and ﬁnancial priorities
to the N8.17 Indeed, analysts have struggled to discern clear institutional and
procedural linkages between policy and the POM development process. The
cause of this disconnect could well be the singular lack of a common
planning lexicon within OPNAV. That said, one can identify two institutional
challenges that have impeded the development of eﬀective plans to drive
programming and budgeting: (1) institutional weaknesses that have pla-
gued the N5; and (2), related to this, the process by which the division has
developed plans.
15Tiﬀany F. Hill, “An Analysis of the Organizational Structures Supporting PPPB within the Military
Departments,” master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008, 100, 113.
16Haynes, “American Naval Thinking in the Post-Cold War Era,” 182.
17According to Rosenberg, this is an outcome of the Navy’s institutional consensus-driven and multi-
layered policy-making process that produces “strategy” as a reﬂection of the institution, as opposed
to senior leadership. David A. Rosenberg, “American Naval Strategy in the Era of the Third World War:
An Inquiry in the Structure and Process of General War at Sea, 1945–90,” in N.A.M. Rodger (ed.),
Naval Power in the Twentieth Century (New York: Macmillan 1996), 243.



























As to the former point, institutionally speaking, the N51 has tradition-
ally been at a disadvantage vis-à-vis other divisions in OPNAV, particularly
the N8. Fundamentally, the N51 has traditionally been a very small oﬃce
(approximately 15), staﬀed mainly by junior oﬃcers, which has worked
against the development of institutional gravitas and a strong institu-
tional memory. In fact, many of the policy and planning related initiatives
undertaken by CNOs have been at the expense of the N5. For instance,
the CNO’s Strategic Actions Group (N00Z) and Naval Policy Advisory
Group (NAPAG) were created out of the N5 and many of these initiatives
which should have been undertaken by the division were placed in ad
hoc bodies, e.g., Deep Blue.18 (It is intriguing to ponder why successive
CNOs have perennially turned to ad hoc bodies – in eﬀect, creating new
staﬀ – to develop key policy initiatives, as opposed to utilizing existing
staﬀ and procedures.) Perhaps because of its understrength and lack of a
strong institutional memory, the N51 has not been perceived as able to
consistently produce guidance on time, and in suﬃcient detail to drive
the POM development process. Probably the best example of the N5’s
relatively weak position within the staﬀ is the fact that the Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR), which should be seen as constituting a quintes-
sential policy and planning driven process, is managed not by that
division, but rather by the N8.
As to the second point, the unenviable situation in which the N5 ﬁnds
itself, vis-à-vis its sister divisions, can only be ascribed to the ambivalence
of successive senior naval leaders about the need for the staﬀ to possess a
strong institutional planning capability. Traditionally, the CNO’s “Sailing
Directions” (i.e., high-level guidance to the Navy) have not been developed
by, or staﬀed through, the N5, but rather have been produced in the N00Z,
which reports directly to the CNO. According to Swartz and Duggan, the
Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO’s) guidance (“PLANORDS”) for the
development of the POM has ignored the inputs of the Navy’s strategic
planning process.19 Key planning documents, such as the 30-year
Shipbuilding Plan (i.e., developing justiﬁcation for shipbuilding), do not
reference any N5 guidance and are developed in the N9 with heavy N8
involvement. In eﬀect, the N8 creates its own guidance, as it both owns
the data derived from its own campaign analysis, which can be used to
justify the priorities that it has determined (and by extension dismantle the
arguments of other divisions), and controls the budget. Planning insularity
18Deep Blue was created in 2001 to assist senior naval leadership to come up with innovative means to
ﬁght terrorism at the strategic level. It was disestablished in 2008.
19According to Swartz and Duggan, the VCNO’s PLANORDS for the development of the POM ignored
the inputs of the Navy’s strategic planning process. See Peter Swartz with Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy
Capstone Strategies and Concepts (2001–2010: Strategy, Policy, Concept, and Vision Documents)




























from policy can be discerned in the N81’s modeling of future threats which
have been criticized for being isolated from political nuances and, there-
fore, not fully informed. That said, the strength of the N8 can be seen in
the actions taken by successive CNOs with programming backgrounds who
have empowered the N8 and have moved responsibilities to that division
from the N5.
To its credit, the N51 has made a number of attempts to lead the
N8’s programming process by providing planning guidance, particularly
since the tenure of CNO Admiral Mike Mullen.20 But the record of
eﬀectiveness of its key planning document, the NSP, has been proble-
matic since its inception in 2006. For instance, NSP14 was never
endorsed by the CNO. For ﬁscal year 2016, the N5 did not even develop
an NSP. At worst, NSPs have been ignored by other OPNAV divisions
(e.g., NSP 13 was not staﬀed, or coordinated within OPNAV). Yet, there
have been some notable successes. NSP12 was generally considered a
useful planning document and the N5 participated in the development
of the POM, and the N81 assisted in the development of the docu-
ment’s risk matrix, which, it is claimed, was ﬁnancially informed.21 One
partial explanation for this uneven record is that as OPNAV (like the rest
of the Department of Defense) struggled to plan during the uncertain-
ties created by Congressionally mandated sequestration, it was shown
that the process to create the NSP simply could not keep up with
events and the demands to develop the POM. However, a severe
critique of the planning documents produced by the N51 has been
their lack of ﬁnancial guidance. A former senior oﬃcial in the N8 stated
that the N51’s guidance simply restated that which the N8 was already
planning to do. Finally, one could argue that these documents have not
diﬀerentiated suﬃciently between what the Navy has to do very well,
and what capabilities need only be good enough.
Comparison with the Other Military Departments
By any objective measurement, OPNAV’s strategic planning process is out of
balance. There is no better means of testing this assertion than by compar-
ing the current OPNAV process with that of its other service counterparts.
There follows a brief analysis of the strategic planning processes of the US
Army and Air Force, from which best practices can be discerned for possible
emulation by OPNAV.
20For a comprehensive description and analysis of OPNAV planning initiatives see Swartz with Duggan,
“U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts.”
21Steve Kelley, “Linking Strategy to POM Development: The Navy Strategic Plan in Support of POM-12
(NSP-12),” undated unclassiﬁed brieﬁng, slide #6.



























Department of the Army
Contrary to the domination of OPNAV by the N8, the Department of the
Army’s Directorate of Operations and Plans (G3/5/7) clearly plays the domi-
nant role in producing, and thereafter managing, the Army Staﬀ’s strategic
planning process. In terms of guidance, The Army Plan (TAP) actually con-
sists of ﬁve separate but closely inter-related documents that are produced
in accordance with a formal policy that outlines the planning process, i.e.,
the Army’s Planning Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System.22 Like
the Air Force (vide infra), in light of a more challenging ﬁnancial environ-
ment, the TAP has recently undergone revisions in order to enable the Army
leadership to focus attention on planning, vice programming, thereby pro-
viding clearer guidance to ﬁnancial decision-making.23 The family of plans
that make up the TAP follow:
● Army Vision. New, to be co-authored as required by the Secretary of the
Army’s and Army Chief of Staﬀ’s oﬃces. It will articulate the desired
objectives established by leadership over a ten-year time horizon and it
is to inform all other sections of the revised TAP.24
● Army Strategic Planning Guidance. To be retired after the ﬁnancial year
2017–21 planning cycle. It established the Army’s institutional strategic
framework to identify the Army’s objectives and will be replaced by
both the Army Vision and the Army Strategic Plan.
● Army Strategic Plan. New, to be developed every four years, and
reviewed every two years, by the G3/5/7. It will articulate the means
by which the Army will fulﬁll its responsibilities over a ten-year time-
frame, and link strategy and the budget by informing annual planning
within the PPBE process.
● Army Planning Guidance. New, to be developed annually by the G3/5/7.
It is to initiate the PPBE process and will provide more detailed gui-
dance to guide key planning issues, before the POM is completed.
● Army Planning Priorities Guidance. To be retired and replaced by the
Army Planning Guidance).
● Army Program Guidance Memorandum. To be developed annually by
the G8 (Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate). It is to translate
operational undertakings to resource tasks, i.e., the alignment of strat-
egy, missions and priorities from the Army Vision, Army Strategic Plan,
22US Department of the Army, “Planning Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System.” To be
revised in light of revisions to TAP.
23See US Department of the Army, “Revisions to The Army Plan,” 16 October 2014. Note that this
memorandum was signed by both the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staﬀ.
24US Department of the Army, The Army Vision: Strategic Advantage in a Complex World (Washington:




























and Army Planning Guidance with other guidance from OSD in build-
ing the POM.
● Army Campaign Plan. To be developed semi-annually by the G3/5/7,
Army’s Deputy Chief of Staﬀ for Operations and Plans. It is to establish
and monitor annual priorities and initiatives as established in the Army
Vision, which requires measurable objectives or decisions.
The Department of the Army’s approach to executing its PPBE is to
produce guidance via consensus-building, at both the staﬀ and senior
leadership levels. In brief, once the Army Strategic Planning Guidance
(“Army Planning Guidance” in future) has been developed, staﬀed, and
approved, the G3/5/7 takes the lead in working directly with the
Directorate of Programs (G8) to ensure that all aspects of the ensuing
POM-build remain in conformance with agreed, and approved, guidance.
In other words, it maintains its involvement in the Army’s PPBE throughout
the entire POM-build. This is essential to ensure that which drives the system
remains an aggregation of priorities developed by the G3/5/7. To date,
planning has not been universally cost-informed; but trends point towards
this practice gaining greater acceptance, since unless a priority is costed, its
true value will always remain elusive. This has been facilitated since the
1990s with opening up the G8’s costing database. Yet to be achieved is a
formal and detailed cross-portfolio, or trade-space actions amongst training,
equipping, and manning; let alone cost-informed risk tolerance at the pro-
grammatic level within the G3/5/7.
This planning coordination is formalized through a series of regular meet-
ings bringing together the G3/5/7 and the G8 throughout the PPBE process.
Speciﬁcally, there is a biweekly meeting of the Council of Colonels, which is co-
chaired by the Chief, Resource Analysis and Integration Oﬃce (G3/5/7); the
Chief, Program Development Division, Program Analysis and Evaluation
Directorate; and the Deputy Director of Financial Management and
Comptroller, Assistant Secretary of the Army (FM&C). These meetings package
proposals, frame issues, and coordinate the staging of decision-making ses-
sions at the two-star level, i.e., Budget and Requirements and Programs Group
(BRP), and the Planning Programming and Budgeting Committee (PPBC) for
issues that cannot be resolved at the level of colonels.
From the perspective of the Army Staﬀ, there is little question that the
G3/5/7 has responsibility for Army-wide prioritization.25 No better evidence
can be seen in the fact that the Army Campaign Plan that directs how
funding is to ﬂow is developed under the authority of the G3/5/7. Yet, it
25US Department of the Army, “Assignment of Functions and Responsibilities within Headquarters
Department of the Army,” General Order 2012-01, 11 June 2012, <http://www.apd.army.mil/pdﬃles/
go1201.pdf>.



























would be a misleading to think that the G8 is solely the resourcing agent of
the Army. The directorate’s focus has changed in recent years to become the
Army’s “equipper,” as witnessed by moving the responsibility of Force
Development from the G3/5/7 to the G8. It should not be a surprise, given
these planning and oversight responsibilities, that the G3/5/7 is signiﬁcantly
larger than that of the G8, i.e., the former has approximately 1000 personnel,
and the latter has several hundred. But Army oﬃcials have acknowledged
that the success of the entire system is premised on clearly stated policy
objectives endorsed by the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staﬀ; other-
wise, as one Army oﬃcial has admitted, the G8, de facto, is in charge of
“guessing” priorities.
Department of the Air Force
The Air Force, like the Army, has a well-developed planning system that is
highly documented with responsibilities spread across the Air Force Staﬀ.
The Air Force is facing a serious challenge of needing to fund ﬁve major
aircraft procurement programs, whilst investing in R&D in ﬁve others.26 In
consequence, the Air Force’s senior leadership has had to revise its planning
system in order to ﬁnd a means of balancing current operations, procure-
ment, and R&D.27 Policy guidance for the new process and supporting
organizations has been issued.28 Current and envisaged key strategic plan-
ning documents include:
● Air Force Strategy. New, to be issued every four years and reviewed
every two years. Developed by the new Directorate of Strategic Plans
and Programs (A5/8). It is envisaged to explain the Air Force’s strategic
purpose. The document has a 30-year horizon and includes a Strategic
Environment and Threat Assessment, and contains Strategic Priorities
and Lines of Operation, science, technology, and research focus areas.
● Air Force Strategic Master Plan. New, to be updated biannually by the
A5/SS.29 It is to provide broad guidance and articulate priorities, goals,
and objectives. The plan is ﬁnancially informed and will articulate
spending over ten years. Annexes to the Strategic Master Plan are
the Human Capital Development Plan, Strategic Posture Plan, and
25US Department of the Army, “Assignment of Functions and Responsibilities within Headquarters
Department of the Army,” General Order 2012-01, 11 June 2012, <http://www.apd.army.mil/pdﬃles/
go1201.pdf>.
26See Jeremiah Gertler, “The Air Force Aviation Investment Challenge,” R44305, Congressional Research
Service, Washington, 11 December 2015.
27US Department of the Air Force, “Strategic Planning System.” To be revised.
28US Department of the Air Force, America’s Air Force: A Call to the Future (Washington: 2014). The




























Capabilities Investment Plan. The annexes are to be revised annually, as
required.30
● Strategic Planning Guidance. New, to be drafted annually by the A5/8. This
document is to inform Core Function Support Plans, articulate planning
choices, and drive the development of the Approved Planning Force, all
with the view of driving the development of the POM.
● Air Force Planning Force. Retained, to be issued biannually, or as
required, drafted by the A5/8. The document provides a “20-year
force structure projection organized as an eﬀects-based capability
portfolio integrating MAJCOM [Major Command] strategic investment
plans with a vector towards the Air Force Vision and the Strategic Plan
. . . It sets the baseline from which risk is measured when ﬁscal con-
straints are applied to the Planning Force.”31
● Annual Planning and Programming Guidance. To be retired.32
In addition to the challenge of balancing investments and current opera-
tions, the Air Force’s PPBE essentially broke down during sequestration, thereby
demonstrating that, inter alia, it could not operate eﬀectively in a period of
budgetary uncertainty. It is envisaged that these changes in the Air Force’s
PPBE process will bring budget development up from the MAJCOMs to the Air
Force Staﬀ in order to ensure that their stated priorities are in conformancewith
the Department of the Air Force’s endorsed strategy and policy priorities. The
new system will allow the Air Force Staﬀ to establish a priority of resource
decisions that look across the entire Air Force, with the objective of militating
against community parochialism. To achieve this objective, in future MAJCOMs
will not be involved in developing the POM, but will be limited to identifying
priorities that will be subordinated to the Air Force Strategic Master Plan.
Current Air Force leadership hopes that this protocol will empower the Air
Force Staﬀ to focus more on policy and strategy, as opposed to chasing the
POM. Thus, the Directorate of Operations, Plans and Requirements (A3/5) and
Directorate of Strategic Plans and Programs (A8) have been reorganized into
the new Directorate of Strategic Plans and Programs (A5/8), ending the status
of the A8 as a stand-alone organization managing the strategic planning
process. The objective of this initiative has been to merge both Operations,
and Plans and Requirements into the A3/5, in order to reinforce the role to be
played by strategic planning. The new Operations, Plans, and Requirements
Directorate (A3) will be stand-alone, while the planning staﬀs will form a new
30US Air Force, USAF Strategic Master Plan (Washington: 2015).
31US Department of the Air Force, “Strategic Planning System.” 3.
32Previously approved by a three-star, in the new system it will no longer be issued. Criticism of the
document included that it was vague to the point of being unhelpful. The way the Strategic Plans,
Deputy Chief of Staﬀ for Plans and Programs (A8X) approached developing the document was
consensus based. This process took too long and it rarely was issued in a timely fashion to inﬂuence
decision-making.



























A5/8 directorate. The objective of this reform is to remove the programmers
from A5/8 and put them in the Secretariat of the Air Force/Financial
Management (SAF/FM) to help prevent programming requirements from over-
taking strategy. According to a senior Air Force general oﬃcer, the new plan-
ning process and organizational structure was needed to enable planners to
focus on strategy and the long term (i.e., 20 years), vice involving themselves in
short-term budget battles.33 By removing the programmers from the strategy
development process, it is envisaged that the A5/8 will produce speciﬁc
guidance and better information than in the past, as well as provide them
with a stronger strategic framework with which they can make resource
decisions. The new A5/8 also includes a division dedicated to ensuring that
MAJCOMs’ inputs to the POM-building process are consistent with the Air
Force’s Strategic Master Plan. Importantly, it will be augmented with a new
assessments branch (the A5S) that will measure the degree to which priorities
approved in the Planning Force are reﬂected in the POM. Air Force planning has
the objective that by continuing its longstanding practice of using ﬁnancially
informed assumptions it will be able to look beyond the FYDP and measure
future capabilities using constant dollar costs. A key aim in this reorganization
of staﬀ and responsibilities has been to increase the number of four-star
general oﬃcer engagements in the process to ensure accountability to
endorsed policy priorities. A clariﬁcation of staﬀ orientation and focus is repre-
sented in Table 1, albeit it has been recognized that there will be diﬃculty
drawing a clear division of responsibilities between Financial Management and
the A5/8.
Comparative diﬀerences with OPNAV’s PPBE
When compared with its service counterparts, OPNAV’s strategic planning
system is unquestionably unique in that, almost by design, it isolates ﬁnan-
cial decision-making from policy guidance and planning priorities.
Notwithstanding the fact that the Army’s and Air Force’s policy and plan-
ning systems are sharply dissimilar to that of OPNAV, there are arguably
practices employed by the other services that could be replicated by
OPNAV, the better to link ﬁnancial execution to policy guidance and
Table 1. Department of the Air Force Planning, Programming, and Execution
Responsibilities.
Financial Management Budgets 2–5 years
Programming/Financial Management Programs 6–20 years
A5/8 Plans 10–30 years
33Aaron Mehta, “Lt General Michael Moeller: USAF Deputy Chief of Staﬀ, Strategic Plans and Programs,”




























planning priorities. Whilst hardly comprehensive, the following practices in
the other two services should merit close study and analysis by OPNAV.
As incomprehensible as it may appear to an outside observer, OPNAV
does not possess a strategic planning policy document, endorsed by the
Navy Secretariat, that establishes and outlines the OPNAV planning process
and assigns respective roles and responsibilities to oﬃcials across OPNAV
divisions. Both the Army and Air Force have established policy that outlines
their PPBE progresses at the headquarters level and ensures that policy
guidance and planning priorities drive their respective PPBE.
The Army Staﬀ keeps policy and priorities as expressed in programs
within the G3/5/7’s Resource Analysis and Integration Oﬃce in the form of
the Army Planning Priorities Guidance (to be replaced by the Army Planning
Guidance). The rationale for this document is that it “Links requirements to
strategy and guides development of resource priorities for operational tasks
over the mid-term period of the next six-year POM plus 5–7 additional
years.” Importantly, it provides additional and explanatory details and
resource priorities to guide the development of programs and budget. It
also identiﬁes and establishes a priority of enduring operational capabilities
required to meet those core Army competencies identiﬁed in Field Manual 1
(FM 2), The Army. Linking Army priorities back to OSD policy, risk guidance is
also provided to programmers and budget oﬃcials, which is in accord with
the QDR Risk Framework.34 Such an analytical process, therefore, further
translates the Army Strategic Planning Guidance (to be replaced by the
Army Strategic Plan) into the more detailed programming priorities that
are represented in Section III of the Army Programming Guidance
Memorandum. The Air Force has created a new process that, whilst organi-
zationally diﬀerent from that of the Army Staﬀ, shares the same objective of
strengthening policy, strategy, and planning in its strategic planning process
to guide resource decision-making. This eﬀort is envisaged to produce a
ﬁscally constrained investment guide that will create a balance between
current and future Air Force priorities.
According to the Air Staﬀ, it has long used cost-informed planning. The
Army Staﬀ is evolving to adopt this practice in order to ensure that its plans
are more ﬁnancially disciplined.
Both the Army and Air Force place importance on the value of cross-staﬀ
coordination meetings to ensure policy priorities are articulated in the POM
development process. The Army Staﬀ, for instance, holds biweekly meetings
that bring the G3/5/7 and the G8 together throughout the PPBE process (until
execution) at the colonel and major general levels to seek to balance policy
priorities and ﬁnancial realities. Moreover, in order to help bridge the gap
34US Army War College, How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook, 2015–2016 (Carlisle
Barracks PA: 2015), 31.



























between policy priorities and budgeting, the G/3/5/7’s Chief of Resource Analysis
and Integration Branch (G3) is a colonel who is handpicked for this key post; a
qualiﬁcation being the candidate must have a programming background.
Finally, the Air Staﬀ is creating a branch in the A5/8 with the objective of
assessing the degree to which A5/8’s guidance is integrated into the bud-
get, whereas the Army’s approach is more of continuous assessment.
Reforming OPNAV’s Strategic Planning Process
It is a clear priority in both the Departments of the Army and Air Force to
create procedures to ensure a policy continuum as the budget is developed,
with planners in the lead, thereby leaving their respective programmers to
optimize budget execution. If one applies these practices from the other
two services to OPNAV, speciﬁc changes to existing authorities and organi-
zations could include the following:
Establish Strategic Planning Policy
As an initial eﬀort to realign OPNAV’s current PPBE process and create a
closer linkage between policy guidance and budget execution would neces-
sitate creating a policy to guide strategic planning, establishing roles and
responsibilities. Such an eﬀort could build on the excellent work contained
in the draft “Navy Strategic Planning Process Instructions,” which has yet to
receive oﬃcial sanction. As a measure to ensure compliance across the staﬀ,
this guidance should be signed by the Secretary of the Navy. In conse-
quence, this document should supersede N8’s POM Serial No. 1: Business
Rules, as the de jure planning policy document in OPNAV. As an element of
this policy guidance, the document should include detailed codiﬁed strate-
gic planning instructions that should address: (1) identifying oﬃcials’ roles
and responsibilities in OPNAV’s strategic planning process; (2) establishing
deadlines for the release of planning priorities in the codiﬁed planning
guidance document to ensure the eﬀective and eﬃcient operation of the
PPBE system in OPNAV; (3) formalizing the N5 as the lead in OPNAV for
policy and planning and maintaining management oversight of the POM
development process; and (4) creating a common planning lexicon that
applies across OPNAV.
Creating a New Navy Strategic Plan
A guiding policy and planning document, akin to the NSP, needs to be
issued at least biannually (reviewed annually) and it must include clearly
stated planning priorities (e.g., NSP/Classiﬁed Annex), be published well




























issued after the initiation of the development of the POM will have minimal
eﬀect. That said, the timely release of policy guidance and planning prio-
rities will require CNO ownership if they are to have the necessary gravitas
to govern the POM development and review process. As a senior Army
oﬃcial stated to the author, as sophisticated as the Army PPBE is, it cannot
function properly without senior leadership establishing priorities. The prac-
tices of the other services inform the observation that one short document
(à la previous NSPs) will not be suﬃcient to provide the detailed guidance to
frame the necessary trade-oﬀ decisions required throughout the develop-
ment of the budget – and thus, by extension, to establish where money
should and should not be spent. Ideally, this cross-OPNAV planning gui-
dance should endeavor to narrow the scope of planning priorities; in eﬀect,
expressing in ﬁnancial terms the areas where to reduce risk and where to
accept more.35 An implied requirement to enable the N5 to execute this task
is a signiﬁcant rebalancing of the apportionment of the current OPNAV staﬀ
organization.
Moreover, a particular need is for the N5 to play a larger role in OPNAV’s
interface with the combatant commanders (COCOMs) to translate their
integrated priority lists (IPLs) into the short-, medium-, and long-range
planning priorities. This implies the need for personnel on the staﬀ with
expertise in operation plans (OPLANs) who can speak with authority when
representing Navy equities with the COCOMs and can translate accurately,
where appropriate, the ﬁnancial implications of OPLANs for the current year
budget.36
Thus, a reinforced NSP-like document, with supporting ﬁnancial gui-
dance, could well serve as the initiation of the planning process, followed
by the development of implementation guidance (developed across OPNAV)
in various documents designed to provide clear priorities to programmers.
Greater N5 Leadership
It is likely that a new version of the previously issued NSP and supporting
programming guidance will require a number of iterations before the new
process can be thought of as possessing the necessary detailed and prior-
itized guidance that will enable the entire OPNAV staﬀ to be constructively
engaged in this new strategic planning process. The N5 needs to become
both the de jure and de facto lead agent for strategic planning and that
includes, as in the other two military departments, maintaining continuous
management responsibilities for the translation of its policy guidance into
35See Peter Swartz’s ambitious outline of what a naval strategy should consider comprised in Swartz
with Duggan, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts.
36See Tripp Barber, “Joint Warfare Analysis: The Key to Shaping DoD’s Future,” Phalanx 47/1 (2014).



























programming priorities and execution. To be more precise, the N5 should
monitor and assess the POM development process as it goes through each
decision gate and be prepared to provide a vector check, as needed. This
can be done by advocating for the strategic planning priorities via staﬀ
coordination in OPNAV (vide infra). And it is during this phase of program-
ming that the N5 will need to attend these meetings armed with numbers.
Thus, OPNAV’s strategic planning needs to be conceptualized as more
than developing the initial guidance that starts the planning process; it must
include oversight responsibilities throughout the entire development of the
POM. This oversight of the POM development and execution process is
essential, as guidance and priorities may be changed by policy, and the
N5 inevitably will need to be prepared to interpret its planning priorities
throughout the execution phase. The N5 will need also to review continu-
ously its planning assumptions and ensure that any modiﬁcations are
expressed in the N8’s programming. A clear metric of success would be
manifest if the N8 were to succeed in focusing on developing capability
optimization solutions, as opposed to guessing at guidance and priorities.
As the N5 clariﬁes existing policy guidance and planning priorities in
OPNAV and develops more detailed guidance, there will become a need for
more formal staﬀ coordination fora to ensure that guidance and priorities
are reﬂected in the N8’s POM-build, as well as to provide mid-course
corrections should policy and priorities change. This could perhaps be
built on the staﬀ coordination framework recently developed by the new
Navy Strategic Enterprise.37 These regular meetings need to become insti-
tutionalized as they have become, for example, in the Army’s PPBC, which
comprises both colonel as well as major general level meetings to ensure
consensus-building in resource decision-making. The N5 could then follow
through and show the Secretary of the Navy and CNO the degree to which
planning priorities have been implemented and identify opportunities
where priority guidance needs to be stronger. Perhaps a contentious
point, however, the Secretary should address the question of who should
chair these meetings when policy is being drafted to establish formal
planning systems, i.e., whether an oﬃcial from the N5 or the N8. Logic
would dictate that, as the N5 should be driving the planning process, that
oﬃce should chair key decision-making meetings. That said, there may be
37This initiative establishes an N51-chaired Strategy Oversight Group (SOG) to meet monthly and is
composed of two/one-star-level ﬂag oﬃcers or Senior Executive Service civilians. Its mandate is to
“coordinate, integrate, and synchronize the individual eﬀorts of all stakeholders involved in the
development, engagement, and assessment of Navy strategy into a single, uniﬁed eﬀort.” Above the
SOG is the Senior Executive Group which will meet on a quarterly basis to “review, approve, and
transmit to the CNO an annual plan on the development, engagement, and assessment of Navy
strategy and recommendations for improving the development, engagement, and assessment of
Navy Strategy.” These fora are to be supported by weekly captain-level Action Oﬃcer Group (AOG)
meetings: Strategy Development AOG, Strategy Engagement AOG, and Strategy Assessment AOG.




























room for the N8 to lead some of the lower-level, technical-in-nature, coor-
dination meetings. However this issue is determined, it is critical that these
fora provide the Secretary and CNO the necessary information and judg-
ments to allow them to make informed decisions.
Costing Navy Strategic Plans
As an element of crafting more detailed planning guidance, the N5 will need
to address its most challenging reform, i.e., how to reconceptualize its
expression of guidance. Heretofore, the NSP, for instance, has largely limited
itself to a statement of priorities in an absolute sense, vice considering
resource priorities per se, which by deﬁnition, are zero sum.
Notwithstanding the laudable eﬀort in NSP 2012, which included a risk
assessment matrix, this annex conﬁned itself to employing a rather basic
red–yellow–green “traﬃc light” matrix and was based on a campaign ana-
lysis. However, it lacked a recognized methodology and was, in the end,
perceived as subjective.38 Whilst useful in the aggregate, such an eﬀort is of
limited utility in the POM development process, which requires greater
ﬁdelity to guide programmers. To be blunt, what is needed is for the N5
to recognize that if they are to be able to guide programmers, then
guidance and priorities must be expressed in ﬁnancial terms. In short, policy
is money and, therefore, it needs to be expressed as such in the develop-
ment of strategic planning guidance.
In consequence, the N5/1, in particular, must start developing plans
articulated in ﬁnancial costs whilst expressing priorities denominated in
terms of money, which will be understandable to the N8 in a clearly binary
manner, viz., money to this limit is to be spent on capability or activity X.
Therefore, the N5/1 will need to become adept at accessing the N8’s
costings databases in developing its own new guidance, as well as monitor-
ing the POM-build to assess the degree to which planning priorities are
driving the development of the POM.
Furthermore, the N5 staﬀ needs to accept that in a bureaucracy, like
OPNAV, where the N8 has dominated the assignment of priorities for years,
the idea of producing long-term development plans, following the seductive
admonition of programmers to planners that they should plan in a
“resource-unconstrained” manner will only serve to isolate N5 from deci-
sion-making regarding where the Navy’s budget is spent. The N5 needs to
set itself the objective that its new strategic planning process will be driven
38To the point, the ﬁrst NSP 2006 was critiqued for lacking costings, i.e., that it was no more than a
strategic vision without a resource plan. Haynes, “American Naval Thinking in the Post-Cold War Era,”
335.



























by ﬁnancially sound guidance that eventually produces an annual plan that
is costed and ﬁnancially sound.
The bureaucratic implications of such a transformation in the manner by
which the N5 conducts strategic planning are challenging. Clearly, the
personnel requirements of such a change are considerable and the new
qualiﬁcations needed in the staﬀ must be addressed in the short term. Staﬀ
expertise in ﬁnancial management, and particularly a solid understanding of
the cost models employed by the N8, implies the need to obtain personnel
with backgrounds in the N8. As a beginning, the N5 should establish a
branch/cell of ﬁnance experts in the N513 who understand the N8’s pro-
gramming methods and costing models to start the transition of translating
words into numbers and thereby making priorities clear. The N5 leadership
should also narrow the scope of its initial strategic planning guidance,
focusing on the areas where additional capabilities are needed and areas
where the Navy can examine the utility of legacy capabilities.
These recommendations in no way argue for the N5 to duplicate the
eﬀorts of the N8; rather they contend that the former must transition to
being capable of expressing guidance and priorities in ﬁnancial terms and
not just words. In essence, the N5 must begin speaking the language of
programmers; and the “dialect” used by programmers is Excel spreadsheets,
as opposed to that preferred by planners, i.e., Word documents. Thus, the
N5 must begin outlining budgetary cost guidance to the N8 for detailed
planning and execution. In an ironical sense, OPNAV must return to the
original theory of PPBS which held that policy establishes “what,” whilst
programmers determine “how” best to obtain it.
Conclusion
For reasons of mission, history, and bureaucratic practice, OPNAV’s PPBE
system is not just at variance with similar systems in the other two military
departments; it is essentially based on antithetical concepts and assump-
tions. To state that OPNAV’s PPBE isolates ﬁnancial decision-making from
policy priorities is an understatement. That the Navy’s budget oﬃce is in the
N82, with the implication that it answers to the CNO, should be seen as
emblematic of the degree to which daily operations are driving strategic
planning out of the resource decision-making process. Arguably, this pro-
cess has produced the world’s best navy, but it has been doing so in a
policy- and increasingly resource-isolated framework. It should not be sur-
prising, therefore, that this process has proved to be sub-optimal in a
ﬁnancially uncertain environment, underscored by a continued need to
maintain a high operations tempo the world over. Therefore OPNAV needs
to rethink its corporate understanding of, and approach to, strategic plan-




























priorities linked to hard resource decision-making can be eﬀectively accom-
plished is by empowering leadership with policy, strategy, and planning
concepts and institutional logic to drive the development of a budget that
will deliver a balanced force.
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